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12th International Crime Science Conference

4th July 2018, British Library, LONDON

This year's conference theme is "Trafficking and exploitation: using science and technology to tackle one of the world’s greatest crime problems."


We are delighted to announce that there is a special half-price fee this year at £99 for the Early Bird Rate.


This year’s event will focus on identifying, responding and adapting to the challenges posed by human trafficking and modern slavery in their various forms – including labour exploitation, sexual exploitation and forced criminality such as county lines. Breaking down silos between related fields, the event will also highlight important developments in other organised crimes such as drugs trafficking. Presentations will cover organised crime networks, cybercrime, forensic science, NGO responses, evidence-based policing, cutting-edge technological developments and the use of big data.


The programme can now be viewed by clicking here  


AIC: Nominations extended for crime prevention awards

Nominations for the 2018 Australian Crime and Violence Prevention Awards have been extended to Friday 29 June!

The awards recognise and reward good practice in the prevention and reduction of violence and other types of crime in Australia.

Nominations are open to projects of all sizes, including smaller initiatives involving local community groups.

Projects can relate to specific groups such as rural and remote communities, women, children, youth, family, migrant, ethnic or Indigenous communities, or specific problems such as alcohol-related violence. The project must have been fully operational prior to 1 February 2017.

Whether it’s a project you are involved in, or a project that you believe deserves recognition, please help spread the word. Head to for more information.

If you are involved in a project that is working towards a safer community or you know of a worthy local program that has reduced crime or violence, nominate now at  


European mental health institutions fall 'far below the standard,' WHO reports

European mental health institutions fall "far below the standard," with no single institution meeting all of the standards for quality of care and human rights, according to a new World Health Organization report. Among the more severe transgressions documented in the report were the use of restraints to manage difficult behavior, sexual abuse of female patients, sleeping on floors, restrictions on communication and little access to "meaningful [...]


European Commission - Statement: Joint Statement on World Refugee Day 2018

Brussels, 20 June 2018

On the occasion of World Refugee Day, Frans Timmermans, First Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Neven Mimica, Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs, Christos Stylianides, Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, and Vera Jourová, Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, made the following statement:

"Every minute, every day, nearly 31 people are forcibly displaced. Today, more than 68.5 million people have been forced to leave their homes due to conflicts and violence, persecution, natural disasters or the very real consequences of climate change –25.4 million of them are refugees.

More than 67 years after the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, its international principles remain more valid than ever. These principles are enshrined in the EU's asylum acquis, and the EU remains committed to continue standing up for those who are in need of help.

As a global player, we are working to tackle and solve the main crises through diplomatic means. As the leading global aid donor in the world, we provide humanitarian assistance and support to refugees, asylum seekers, displaced people, inside and outside Europe. We have shown unprecedented support during the migratory crisis of 2015 and 2016 by accommodating hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing war and persecution, and we continue to provide protection to those in need: in 2017 alone, EU Member States granted protection to more than 538 000 people.

Our support also reaches those displaced by long-standing conflicts, from Afghanistan to Colombia to the Horn of Africa, while responding to emerging crises, such as the displacement of the Rohingyas. It has given a lifeline to millions of Syrian refugees and their host communities inside the country and across the region.

In this endeavour we work hand in hand with our partners around the world, certain that only a global response can match the challenge ahead. To this end we are building an ever closer relation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, responding to the plight of refugees worldwide and developing innovative solutions. For example, in November 2017, together we put in place an Emergency Transit Mechanism to evacuate those in need of international protection from Libya for further resettlement to Europe and have so far already helped over 1,600 people. These very same principles of solidarity, shared responsibility, multilateralism and engagement will be guiding us towards the adoption of the UN Global Compact on Refugees later this year.

But challenges remain. We must continue our work together with our Member States to establish more legal and safe pathways and close the dangerous and irregular migration routes. Over the next two years, Member States have committed to resettle more than 50,000 of the most vulnerable persons and provide them with a new home in the EU. We must also reach, without delay, an agreement on the reform our Common European Asylum System based on the principles of responsibility and solidarity. And we must work harder to foster the integration of those who receive protection in the European Union and in particular the most vulnerable, such as women and children.

In times of increasing divisive rhetoric against vulnerable people fleeing war and persecution, the EU is and will continue to protect those in need, and we will continue to endeavour to bring stability where there is conflict."

Probation in Europe updates

Probation in Europe develops very fast. On this page, you can find the updated chapters of  the book ‘Probation in Europe’ (2008) that was written by Anton van Kalmthout and Ioan Durnescu.

Radical changes are being made in some jurisdictions and it is not yet clear how these transformations will shape the form and the practice of probation in these countries. Therefore chapters about these countries will be written later on. Once they are ready, they are uploaded here.


1. Introduction to the 2013-2014 editiondownload

Written by the editors Mr. Anton van Kalmthout and Mr. Ioan Durnescu


1. Introduction to the 2013-2014 edition in Germandownload


Austria 2013download

Chapter Austria, written by Christoph Koss and Christian Grafl, 2013. Published by CEP.


Belgium 2015download

Chapter Belgium, written by Aline Bauwens and Annie Devos, 2015. Published by CEP.


Catalonia 2013download

Probation in Europe - Chapter Catalonia, written by Jaume Martin Barberan and Elena Larrauri Pijoan, 2013. Published by CEP.


Croatia 2014download

Chapter Croatia, written by Dijana Simpraga, Snjezana Maloic and Neven Ricijas, 2014. Published by CEP.


Denmark 2017download

Chapter Denmark, written by Anette Storgaard and Lene Skov, 2017, published by CEP


England & Wales 2013download

Chapter England & Wales, written by Sue Hall and Rob Canton, 2013. Published by CEP.


Estonia 2013download

Probation in Europe - Chapter Estonia, written by Jaan Ginter and Rait Kuuse, 2013. Published by CEP


Finland 2013download

Probation in Europe - Chapter Finland, written by Matti J. Tolvanen and Henrik Linderborg, 2013. Published by CEP.


Georgia 2017download

Probation in Europe, chapter Georgia, written by Teimuraz Magradze and Nino Gozalishvili, 2016. Published by CEP


Greece 2015download

Probation in Europe, chapter, Greece, written by Michael Mavris, Nicolaos Koulouris and Maria Anagnostaki , 2015. Published by CEP.


Italy 2016download

Chapter Italy, written by Ms. Roberta Palmisano and Mr. Michele Ciarpi


Jersey Channel Islands 2014download

Chapter Jersey Channel Islands, written by Brian Heath and Peter Raynor, 2014. Published by CEP.


Kosovo 2014download

Chapter Kosovo, written by Rexhep Gashi and Metije Ademi, 2014. Published by CEP.


Latvia 2013download

Probation in Europe - Chapter Latvia, written by Liene Klisane, Imants Jurevicius and Andrejs Judins, 2013. Published by CEP.


Luxembourg 2013download

Probation in Europe - Chapter Luxembourg, written by Daniel Biancalana and Guy Schmit, 2013. Published by CEP.


Malta 2016download

Chapter Malta, written by Miriam Sevasta and Sandra Scicluna. Published by CEP.


Northern Ireland 2013download

Chapter Northern Ireland, written by Brendan Fulton and Nicola Carr, 2013. Published by CEP.


Romania 2013download

Probation in Europe - Chapter Romania, written by Ioan Durnescu and Valentin Schiaucu, 2013. Published by CEP.


Serbia, 2014download

Chapter Serbia, written by Jelena Zeleskov Djoric, Ana Batricevic and Marija Kuzmanovic, 2014. Published by CEP.


Slovak Republic 2017download

Chapter Slovak Republic written by Martin Lulei Vladimír Cehlár, 2017, published by CEP


Spain 2016download

Chapter Spain, written by Esther Montero Pérez de Tudela and Carmen Rocío Garcia Ruiz


Sweden 2018download

Chapter written by Gabriella Boijsen and Gustav Tallving, 2018


Switzerland 2013download

New McCarthyism or rule of the law: the dilemma of radicalisation

An article by Sergio Bianchi

The policies and practices aimed at preventing radical phenomena are profoundly changing the landscape of the EU Justice, impacting on the overall governance of security, but also on the roles of police forces, intelligence agencies and judiciary within prison and probation. Since 2005, practices that traditionally belong in the field of social policies are now under the umbrella of security and antiterrorism due to their ideological and religious components. The ancient borderlines between separate jurisdictions and powers, keys, doors and guardians, which guaranteed a fair system of checks and balances, tend to fall in the new model of ‘prevention policing’, which seems to have freed itself from all the complexes that historically linked this concept to totalitarian regimes and ideological repression.

This has a whole series of practical and political consequences.

Firstly, legal and procedural consequences. Precisely what is meant by prevention and, more specifically, the prevention of radicalisation – i.e. prevention of an ideological nature, in an area of pre-crime, halfway between the political and the religious – remains the crux of the matter, just as it remains to be understood (and regulated) who can and should activate practices to prevent radicalisation, with which procedures, and which are the tasks of the various agencies involved. Finally, how can the re-cognitive functions of judges be exercised in a prevention procedure with respect to purely potestative functions.

Secondly, consequences on civil and fundamental rights. With the sudden entry of radicalisation in prison practices as a theme of anti-terrorism, this specific type of religious, ideological and behavioural information derived from prison observations departs from the ‘social space of rehabilitation’ and, like other confidential information, becomes administrative security data. How a Muslim prays or dresses, or what a Muslim thinks of foreign policy, is no longer just a sociological fact for the rehabilitative team to work with, but becomes ‘investigative or pre-investigative information’. His praying and his political judgments do not end up in the prisoner’s file, as is the case with the other prison observation data managed by the re-socialisation teams, but is managed separately in appropriate IT DBs, in the context of targeted applications aimed and set up for security procedures. Moreover, contrary to judicial information or the hypotheses of crime, the data on radicalisation do not end up on the prosecutor’s table, because obviously the crime is missing: there is generally only the risk index according to new, vague prevention criteria defined by different Risk Assessment tools (VERA2R, ERG22+, etc.). The decisions on profiling, with all the related implications as regards surveillance, prison allocation of inmates and security measures, are adopted according to intelligence profiling models by central police bodies with new functions of an ‘intelligence-led police’ according to American and Anglo-Saxon models, and no longer by the judges and the multidisciplinary rehabilitation teams, as in the traditional penitentiary models.

Several general risks are connected to this approach, which should be taken into consideration by the EC, EP and the Council:

  1. Inconsistency with the EU legal framework. The cornucopia of personal and patrimonial preventive practices to counter radicalisation, terrorism, cyber and organised crime, recently brought to the forefront a creeping tension between security needs, often interpreted through administrative measures, from one side, and the provisions of Directive 2014/41/EU (European Investigation Order) and Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (European Arrest Warrant), on the other side, which are requiring a high level of procedural jurisdictionalisation of the penal procedures and an enhanced involvement of the judiciary functions.
  2. The growing use of security preventive measures run the risk to expose prison policies and practices to a high level of desocialisation effects, generated by the difficulties to combine restrictive security measures with the needs of reintegration and rehabilitation for inmates, which is one of the missions of the prison systems. The compatibility of strict security preventive measures based on suspects against the Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA is an example, which explains why inmates under the radicalisation radar are largely deprived of their rights, they are not transferred and generally don’t benefit of alternative measures.
  3. Finally, the compatibility with the ECtHR jurisprudence on prevention risk to be jeopardised. The hallmark of the deradicalisation models risks becoming (1) the indeterminacy of the social risk criteria, tainted by prejudice, politicisation or specific ignorance, which (2) generates unpredictability in the monitored subjects/communities, which they often do not even understand, given their cultural distance, and therefore (3) they open up wide spaces to the arbitrariness of the administrative authorities in the practices of prevention, (4) above all in the absence of judicial supervision.

Under Directive 2017/541/EU, the Union and its Member States have significantly expanded the scope of ‘terror-related crimes’ to all so-called preparatory acts. The extension of these penal measures in such a flexible form probably allows the introduction of ‘factual elements’ typical of criminal processes in prevention procedures. This element could make all the work, effort and investment in ideological prevention, on which the EU and its agencies concentrate today, superfluous. By bringing the phenomenon of prevention back into an equal relationship with criminal law – with clear procedures derived from the ECtHR’s jurisprudence and the ‘Stockholm’s Roadmap’, as well as other European directives such as EIO – European security systems can still balance security and justice, prevention and law. This is what we need to prevent radicalisation.

Click on the link to read the report ‘Radicalisation: no prevention without juridicalisation‘.

European Commission welcomes agreement to improve the functioning of Eurojust and boost cooperation between national authorities against cross-border

European Commission - Daily News

Daily News 19 / 06 / 2018

Brussels, 19 June 2018

Today, the Commission welcomes the agreement reached by the European Parliament and the EU Member States on the reform of the Eurojust agency, which helps EU national judicial authorities to team up and to fight against cross-border crime and terrorism. The new rules will facilitate the cooperation between Eurojust and its national members, with national authorities, with Europol and other agencies, such as European Border and Coast Guard Agency or the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The new rules will also allow for a close cooperation between Eurojust and the futureEuropean Public Prosecutor Office, which will be a specialised body to investigate and prosecute crimes against the EU budget, such as corruption or fraud with EU funds, or cross-border VAT fraud. Finally, the new rules will ensure that the European Parliament and national Parliaments are more involved in assessing Eurojust's activities. Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, Věra Jourová said: “Every year, Eurojust helps facilitate cooperation between national authorities in their investigations and prosecutions. In 2017 alone, Eurojust delivered concrete support in 4,500 investigations in all Member States and in cases which matter most to our citizens: terrorism, illegal migration and cybercrime, to name just a few." Recently Eurojust has helped solve cases, such as the dismantlinga drug smuggling and money laundering network active in Germany, Italy and Spain; supporting the investigation of the alleged fraud in the FIFA or solving a murder case within 24 hours, with European Arrest Warrants and European Investigation Orders involving Hungary, Germany and Austria. The provisional agreement reached today during the final trilogues, must now be formally approved by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. Following approval, the Regulation will be published in the EU's Official Journal and enter into force 20 days later. Eurojust's annual report is available here(For more information: Christian Wigand- Tel.: +32 229 62253; Mélanie Voin – Tel.: +32 229 58659)

Australian Institute of Criminology - Latest Publications






New research on Commonwealth fraud investigations and forced marriage

Last week, the Australian Institute of Criminology released two new publications, which are available now on the AIC website.

Statistical Report

Research Report

For the latest crime and justice facts and figures, visit Crime Statistics Australia.






European Commission - Fact Sheet: Questions & Answers: Reinforced security funding for 2021-2027

Strasbourg, 13 June 2018

The Juncker Commission has made security a top priority since day one. It is the most basic and universal of rights to feel safe and secure in your own home.

The EU budget has a key role to play in supporting Member States in keeping Europeans safe, in particular when security threats know no borders and insidiously target our values and our way of life.

How will the future internal security budget change?

Over recent years, security threats have intensified and diversified. They are increasingly cross-border in nature meaning Member States can no longer act alone. While protecting citizens is a national competence, the European Union plays a vital role in supporting Member States' efforts. Security will remain a defining issue for the EU for years to come and Europe's citizens rightly expect their Union and national governments to deliver security in a fast-changing and uncertain world.

The future budget must match those political ambitions. The European Commission proposes to substantially increase the current security funding – from €3.5 billion to €4.8 billion – to build a Union resilient to future security challenges and ready to respond in emergencies. The overall budget for security in 2021-2027 will be comprised of the reinforced Internal Security Fund (€2.5 billion), safer decommissioning of nuclear activities in some Member States (€1.2 billion) and bolstered EU Agencies in the area of security (€1.1 billion).

Today's Regulation does not cover the funding for the Agencies: Europol, CEPOL and EMCDDA, for which the allocated budget of €1.1 billion is to be presented separately.

Why provide funding from the EU budget for security?

Over recent years, security threats have intensified and diversified in Europe. The common thread to recent terror attacks, new avenues of organised crime, and ever-growing incidents of cybercrime is their cross-border dimension. This demands a strong and coordinated response at the EU level. The security challenges the Union faces, such as international terrorism, cannot be managed by individual Member States alone.

The financial and technical support of the EU has already demonstrated its worth and will continue to do so in the next budgetary period. It has brought about concrete results and showed clear added-value when for example it supported the purchase of surveillance equipment following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, or the exemplary cooperation between French and Belgian authorities, through the Task Force Fraternité, set up by Europol.

How will the Internal Security Fund better support new and emerging challenges?

The reinforced Internal Security Fund (ISF) will be more flexible and equipped with tools to quickly respond to emerging security challenges. It will also be better coordinated with other EU funds, which touch upon security related issues.

Firstly, the future ISF will focus on three new objectives: (1) increasing the exchange of information; (2) intensifying cross-border joint operations; (3) and strengthening capabilities to combat and prevent crime. Those objectives will allow Member States more flexibility in delivering on key security priorities namely the fight against terrorism and radicalisation; serious and organised crime; cybercrime; and protection of victims of crimes.

Secondly, the future ISF will be based on a 60%-40% split. This means that €1.25 billion of the fund will be allocated to Member States upfront (with a later mid-term top up of €250 million), allowing them to make long-term security investments. The remaining 40%, i.e. €1 billion, will be reserved for the "thematic facility" and devoted to targeted support to Member States helping them to respond more effectively when faced with emergencies and unforeseen security challenges.  

Finally, security is a cross-cutting issue touching upon multiple policy areas. While the future ISF is a dedicated financial instrument in the area of security, it will work more effectively with other EU funds such as the Asylum and Migration Fund and Integrated Border Management, which also include security components. This will help Member States to tackle security issues in a more comprehensive way building national preparedness at all levels and across sectors.

What is new about the Internal Security Fund?

The current Internal Security Fund (ISF) has been effective and has contributed to a high level of security in the Union. However, public consultations emphasised the need for simplification and greater flexibility in the delivery of home affairs funding instruments. In this context the future ISF will include:

  • More flexibility and better emergency response: The new fund has been designed to ensure sufficient flexibility to channel emergency funding to Member States when needed and address new and critical priorities as they emerge. €1 billion of the Fund will be reserved for unforeseen security challenges, making the fund tailored to Member States' needs and ready to quickly respond to emergencies;  
  • Greater coordination across EU policies: Security is a cross-cutting issue and touches upon many policy areas. While the future ISF is a dedicated financial instrument in the area of security, it will work more effectively with other EU funds, such as the Asylum and Migration Fund and the Integrated Border Management Fund, which also include security components. This will help Member States to tackle security issues in a more comprehensive way building national preparedness at all levels and across sectors. In addition, the fund will include support work to reduce drug demand, for instance, through awareness raising campaigns. The measures for reducing drug demand are currently covered by the Justice Programme.

What actions will not be funded under Internal Security Fund?

There are measures which are the sole responsibility of Member States and the EU cannot support them with ISF funding. Those measures include:

  • Measures limited to the maintenance of public order at national level;
  • Measures covering the purchase or maintenance of standard equipment, standard means of transport or standard facilities of the law enforcement and other competent authorities;
  • Measures with a military or defence purpose;
  • Equipment of which at least one of the purposes is customs control;
  • Coercive equipment, including weapons, ammunition, explosives and riot sticks, except for training purposes;

What happened to the two components: ISF-Borders & Visa and ISF-Police?

The Commission aims to guarantee better and more integrated management of the EU's external borders. This is why the current Borders and Visa instrument is being moved from the Internal Security Fund to the new Integrated Border Management Fund, which will itself also include a new instrument: the Customs Control Equipment Instrument. As regards the future Internal Security Fund, it structurally corresponds to the current Police Instrument of the Internal Security Fund.

How much is allocated to the different security priorities?

The future Internal Security Fund (ISF) does not propose specific allocations per priority nor objective. Security challenges are constantly evolving and Member States are best placed to identify their needs in order to meet the security priorities. Each Member State will have to ensure – and the Commission will confirm – that the priorities addressed in their national programmes are consistent with, and respond to the Union's priorities and challenges in the area of security

Under their national programmes Member States will be allocated 50% of the total budget of the fund upfront, amounting to €1.25 billion. A fixed top-up of 10 % amounting to €0.25 billion of the overall funding will be made at the mid-term. The remaining 40 % of the overall budget, amounting to €1 billion, will be periodically allocated to specific priorities in the Member States. This flexibility will allow Member States to use the available funding according to their actual needs and respond quickly to new security challenges and emergencies.

Each Member State will receive at the start of the programming period a one-time fixed amount of €5 million to ensure a critical mass, plus an amount that varies according to a distribution key weighted on the following criteria:

  • 45% in inverse proportion to gross domestic product;
  • 40% in proportion to the size of population; and
  • 15% in proportion to the size of territory.

How will the Internal Security Fund be simplified and made more flexible?

The main simplification measures relate to the alignment of the fund with the Single Rule Book. For instance, the Commission aims to increase the use of simplified cost options such as lump-sums and streamlining horizontal rules for auditing and controls.

In terms of flexibility, the future ISF provides for more tailored and needs-based funding.

How will coherence with other funds be increased?

Security is a cross-cutting issue touching upon multiple policy areas. While the Internal Security Fund (ISF) will be the Union's dedicated instrument in the area of security, greater consistency and efficiency will be sought with other EU funds which include security components. Complementarities should be ensured in particular with:

  • The Asylum and Migration Fund and the Integrated Border Management Fund, border surveillance measures, such as detection of smuggling of illegal goods, explosives, precursors, illegal migration and security screenings at the external borders are key to maintaining the EU's overall security;
  • The Cohesion Policy Funds, Horizon Europe, the Digital Europe Programme, the Rights and Values Programme as well as Justice Programme all include a focus on security, such as investing in security research and providing adequate protection to crime victims;
  • The European Social Fund+ also includes security elements, in the area of drugs policy, security of infrastructure and public spaces, cybersecurity and the prevention of radicalisation;
  • InvestEU can also play a key role in increasing the security of investments in infrastructure throughout the Union and in the security of IT systems through addressing cybersecurity.

Further complementarities will be found with other measures outside the Union supported through the EU's external assistance instruments.

How will monitoring and evaluation be improved?

The Commission will directly monitor the implementation of the actions under direct and indirect management. In the case of shared management, each Member State will establish a management and control system for its programme and ensure the quality and the reliability of the monitoring system, of data and of indicators. In order to facilitate a swift start to the fund's implementation by 1 January 2021, it will be possible to ‘roll-over' existing, well-functioning management and control systems, to the next budget period.

The assessment of performance orientation is significantly improved for the next financial period. In addition to output and result indicators, a set of core performance indicators are also being proposed. Member States should send data for each programme – broken down by specific objectives – six times per year. These data should refer to the cost of operations and the values of common output and result indicators.

Member States will also be required to send an annual performance report, which should set out information on the progress made in implementing their national programmes and in achieving the milestones and targets. A review meeting between the Commission and each Member State will be organised every 2 years to examine the performance of each programme. At the end of the period, each Member State will submit a final performance report.

Why is the financial support for Europol being increased?

The role and relevance of all of the EU Agencies in the area of security, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), has evolved during the 2014-2020 financing period. Europol has become particularly relevant in supplying Member States with intelligence, coordinating different strands of the fight against organised crime and terrorism, and cracking down on illegal terrorist content online. This was enabled by new structures created within Europol, such as:

  • The European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), which for example, worked closely with cybercrime units in the countries affected by the WannaCry ransomware attack, and provided operational support and helped coordinate international efforts to mitigate the threat and help the victims;
  • The European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC), which helps to ensure an effective and coordinated response to the challenge of international terrorism such as the one posed by Da'esh. It does so by providing operational support upon request and tackles the threat of returning foreign terrorist fighters, or by enabling the sharing of intelligence on terrorism financing;
  • The European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC), helped support Member States' investigations after it became clear that the numbers of irregular migrants that arrived in 2016 were, in part, being organised by criminal migrant smuggling networks busy turning a profit on human misery.

Europol also played an invaluable role in the Task Force Fraternité in the days and weeks following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015.

However, the increased financial support for Europol will not come from the Internal Security Fund (ISF) directly. The EU Agencies working in the area of security benefit from a separate budget allotment, to be presented separately.

Will other specialised EU agencies in the field of security receive increased financial support?

While Europol has indeed a key role to play, other agencies such as CEPOL and EMCDDA are just as important for ensuring other aspects of the Union's security.

CEPOL ensures that Member States' law enforcement authorities have the training they need to carry out their duties and the EMCDDA is key in tackling the societal challenges such as drug trafficking and drug addiction represent.

In addition to the €2.5 billion under the Internal Security Fund, and to be presented separately, the overall budget for the Agencies under the security cluster will be increased up to €1.1 billion, representing a 29% increase compared to 2014-2020 financial period.

Why is there funding for nuclear decommissioning?

The EU's nuclear decommissioning assistance programmes (NDAP) aim to assist Member States in the process of winding and shutting down those nuclear installations in the final step in their lifecycles, while keeping the highest level of safety. This helps provide substantial and durable support for the health of workers and the general public, preventing environmental degradation and providing for real progress in nuclear safety and security.

For 2021-2027, the Union will continue to provide strictly targeted financial support:

  • €552 million is allocated to Lithuania to support the decommissioning of the Ignalina nuclear power plant;
  • €118 million is allocated to Bulgaria and Slovakia. In the case of Bulgaria, the aim is to decommission units 1 to 4 of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant. For Slovakia, it is the Bohunice V1 nuclear power plant;
  • €348 million is allocated for the decommissioning and radioactive waste management of the Commission's nuclear research facilities operated and/or owned by the JRC.
  • €160 million is allocated to general nuclear safety and safeguards